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SHOULD "SUBSTITUTE" PRIVATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL ENFORCE PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTIONS? BALANCING THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE
ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIAL COUNSEL
ARRANGEMENT
Julie E. Steiner*
INTRODUCTION

There is a developing phenomenon of quasi-privatized
environmental enforcement occurring directly on behalf and
in the name of governments by entrepreneurial attorneys. 1
These counselors contract with and substitute 2 for the public
enforcement agency (typically the State Attorney Generals),

* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of
Law. I wish to thank the attendees at the Society of Environmental Law and
Economics at Emory Law School, the Eighth Global Conference on
Environmental Justice and Global Citizenship held at Oxford University, the
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Denver, and a faculty
workshop at St. John's University School of Law, for their insightful comments.
I also thank Robert Morelli and Evan Foxx for their invaluable research
assistance.
1. States, territories and Native American tribes (collectively, "States")
utilize environmental special counsel arrangements. These arrangements,
however, are presently limited to the State level because the United States
Government bans such arrangements at the federal level under Executive
Order No. 13,433. See Exec. Order No. 13,433, Protecting American Taxpayers
From Payment of Contingency Fees, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,441 (May 16, 2007). State
appetite for the arrangement varies, reflecting different political receptivity and
policy enforcement tolerance particular to the sovereign. . See generally
Manhattan Inst., Ctr. for Legal Policy, Regulation Through Litigation: The New
Wave of Government-Sponsored Litigation, Conference Proceedings, 1
MANHATIAN INST. CONF. SERIES 7 (1999), available at http://www.manhattan
institute.org/pdfi'mics1.pdf (noting that there are Attorneys General who do not
enter into such agreements).
2. Drawing from the private attorneys general organizational typology
articulated by Professor William Rubenstein, in Part I this Article categorizes
these types of enforcers as a variety of "substitute" private attorneys general.
See William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why
It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004).
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deriving professional payment by drawing a contingent fee
out of the public's environmental damage award.
To the extent that commentators have focused on this
enforcement phenomenon, they have never recognized the
trend as part of a broader movement toward environmental
enforcement outsourcing.
The attention, moreover, has
largely centered on whether the arrangement violates the
standard of neutrality,3 whether it improperly regulates
through litigation rather than legislation, 4 whether it
circumvents the proper appropriations system, 5 or whether it
is ethically appropriate. 6 Because such critiques have not
viewed this development as part of a larger environmental
enforcement trend, they have never addressed whether this
professional compact optimally facilitates the goals of
environmental enforcement. 7
3. Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power:
Constitutional and Political Implications, SEARLE CTR. RESEARCH ROUNDTABLE
ON EXPANSION OF LIABILITY UNDER PuB. NUISANCE 6 (200B), available at
http://www .law .northwestern.edulacademicsisearle/paperslRedishJevised.pdf
(concluding the "government's use of private contingent fee attorneys in civil
litigation is (1) inconsistent with the nation's democratic tradition, (2) unethical,
and (3) a violation of the Due Process Clause"); Application for Leave to File
Amici Curiae Brief and Proposed Amici Curiae Brief of Legal Ethics Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky et al. in Support of Petitioners, Cnty. of Santa Clara v.
Superior Court, No. S1636B1 (Cal. Apr. 27, 2009), 2009 WL 1541977
[hereinafter Law Professors Amici Brief] (evaluatiIlg whether there should be a
blanket prohibition against local government entities' ability to retain private
counsel on a contingency fee basis to assist in the pursuit of a lead paint
abatement public nuisance action from the standpoint of government neutrality
and legal ethics).
4. Redish, supra note 3; Victor E. Schwartz et aI., Tort Reform Past,
Present and Future: Solving Old Problems and Dealing With "New Style"
Litigation, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 237, 258--59 (2000); John J. Zefutie, Jr.,
Comment, From Butts to Big Macs-Can the Big Tobacco Litigation and
Nation- Wide Settlement with States' Attorneys General Serve as a Model for
Attacking the Fast Food Industry?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 13B3, 1411-13
(2004); Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, USA TODAY, Feb.
11, 1999, at A15.
5. Victor E. Schwartz et aI., Governments' Hiring of Contingent Fee
Attorneys Contrary to Public Interest, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Aug. B, 200B, at
4, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/OB-OB-OBschwartz.pdf ("[TJhese 'new
style' cases give the state executive branch and local governments a new
revenue source without having to raise taxes.").
6. Redish, supra note 3, at 6.
7. While Professor David A. Dana did not focus on environmental
enforcement, in Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative
Evaluation of Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
315 (2001), he recognized that the tobacco litigation alliance between the
plaintiffs' bar and States would likely reappear in other contexts. See id.. His
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This Article suggests that the development of the
environmental special counsel arrangement should be
recognized as part of a broader trend of substitute private
attorney general enforcement, covering remediation, cost
recovery, natural resource damage, climate change, and
public nuisance actions. The Article further addresses an
underappreciated inquiry about whether the arrangement
furthers the deterrence and restorative compensation goals of
environmental enforcement. To address the latter question,
the Article identifies and weighs the costs and benefits of the
environmental special counsel arrangement. The Article
posits that the restorative compensation goal is inherently
equitable in nature, which conflicts with the entrepreneurial
attorney's incentive to shape the character of the damage
award toward monetized recovery rather than restorative
relief.
Part I establishes the necessary background context for
an informed dialogue by delineating the contours of the
"substitute environmental special counsel" arrangement. 8 In
so doing, the Article describes the contexts in which
governments utilize the environmental special counsel
arrangement and identifies the unique characteristics of the
arrangement to distinguish it from other privatized
environmental enforcement structures such as citizen suits. 9
Such environmental special counsel arrangements are
brought by private attorney generals: (i) whose standing to
sue is derivative of the government's parens patriae or public
trust standing,10 and (ii) who fund public litigation in return
for a contingency fee drawn from the damage award.
piece sought to frame important issues, identify weaknesses in the "democracy"
critique, and direct attention to the conflict of interest and agency cost issues.
See id.
8. These arrangements are referenced in pleadings and literature by a
variety of terms, typically as "special Attorney General," "outside counsel" and
"special counsel" agreements.
This Article adopts the uniform term
"environmental special counsel" and defines their common attributes
9. Under the typical citizen suit provisions, any individual or organization
that can demonstrate constitutional standing can initiate a federal lawsuit in
the district court for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, § 505, 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (2010); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, § 7002, 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (2010); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2010); see also
JEFFREY G. MILLER & ENVTL. LAw INST., CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAws 3-5 (1987).
10. Contrast the environmental special counselor's derivative standing from
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Part II identifies the costs and benefits from the
standpoint of whether the arrangement maximizes the
government's ability to achieve the environmental
of deterrence
and
restorative
enforcement
goals
compensation.
In this Part, "costs" represent negative
impacts on enforcement goals, and practices that facilitate
these goals are considered ''benefits."
Part III balances the costs and benefits and proposes that
certain factors deserve more weight than others as a matter
of environmental enforcement policy. As such, the Article
suggests that the benefits of privatized enforcement are of
sufficient magnitude to justify and encourage the
arrangement because the arrangement fills an undesirable
enforcement gap where environmental violations go
undetected or under-enforced. l1 The Article posits that
private citizen suit enforcement is a useful (but incomplete)
augmentation scheme, and argues that substitute
environmental special counsel enforcement should exist to
help fill the current structural gaps in the enforcement
scheme.
Part IV suggests a reformative approach. Specifically,
the Article suggests a fee-shifting approach on top of the
damage award in place of a contingency fee drawn from the
damage award compensation structure, an open and
competitive bidding requirement, a preference for
government-led enforcement where feasible, and adequate
controls on the monitoring process. From an environmental
enforcement perspective, such reforms temper the worst costs
of the contingency fee arrangement while still sufficiently
incentivizing privatized enforcement. 12

a citizen suit enforcer's need to demonstrate independent Article III standing.
11. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 189 (2000).
12. The Author recognizes that when structural curbs are placed on the
arrangement, there may be a consequential dampening of entrepreneurial
behavior. In Part IV, this Article makes the case that these structural reforms
are worth the potential consequences, theorizing that such curbs will still
provide sufficient incentive for entrepreneurialism-as seen in such other
contexts as securities and class actions-while still guarding against some of
the more dramatic costs that are particularly acute in entrepreneurial
environmental enforcement.
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIAL COUNSEL ARRANGEMENT

Environmental special counselors are a curious
enforcement breed.
To the outside observer, they are
government attorneys-environmental special counselors
bring suit in the name of the government, have authority to
negotiate on behalf of the sovereign to redress public injury,
and sign pleadings alongside or in place of the government.
And yet, they are different from their government
counterparts in several crucial respects. They fund the
litigation costs of the action and, in exchange, have an
entrepreneurial investment in the outcome of the litigation by
virtue of their contingency fee arrangement. Since their
public charge and their private economic interests intersect,
environmental special counselors exhibit a mixture of public
and private attributes-a cross between civil claim
prosecutors and private entrepreneurs. They find close
analogy with private entrepreneurial attorney representation
of states in claims against "Big Tobacco."13
What this Article refers to as "substitute environmental
special counsel arrangements" began in the 1980s in the
context of state litigation for asbestos removal. 14
The
asbestos public nuisance abatement action served as the
prototype for the wave of public nuisance tort claims that
later surfaced in a number of states in the form of lead paint
nuisance abatement actions. These lead paint lawsuits have
been brought by environmental special counsel against
numerous industrial manufacturers alleging that the sale of
lead-based paint products, which ultimately found their way
into the public environment, constituted a public nuisance. 15

13. Julie E. Steiner, Private Enforcement of Contamination and Climate
Change Liability Litigation, 9 A.B.A. ENERGY LITIG. J. 4 (Winter 2010).
14. Walter Olson, Tort Travesty, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2007, available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.orglhtmICwsj-tort_travesty.htm.
15. Recently, many of these lead paint lawsuits have been rejected on their
merits in the courts. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110
(Mo. 2007) (en bane); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007); State v.
Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428 (R.!. 2008). In July 2008, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court overturned a verdict against three lead paint companies,
concluding that the trial judge erred in failing to grant defendants' motion to
dismiss because "the state has not and cannot allege any set of facts to support
its public nuisance claim." Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 435-36.
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On a track somewhat distinct from the public nuisance
abatement action context, environmental special counselors
spearhead remedial lawsuits, bringing claims for
environmental cleanup, cost recovery and natural resource
damages. 16 These actions are typically brought under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"),17 state statutes, and common law
theories. 1s
For example, in the Northern District of Oklahoma,
Attorney General Drew Edmonson contracted with substitute
environmental special counselors to sue major poultry
processing manufacturers-including Tyson Foods-in what
are termed the "Big Chicken" lawsuits. 19 The suits seek
equitable and monetary damages for contamination of the
Illinois River watershed resulting from poultry litter run from
processing operations, which caused damage downstream in
Oklahoma. 20 Similarly, in litigation inspiring the name "Big
Climate," the Native Village of Kivalina sued ExxonMobil and
a bevy of other defendants in the energy supply and
distribution chain ("Kivalina"). 21
Raising allegations
16. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223 (lOth Cir. 2006);
Louisiana v. Rowan Co., Civ. No. H-08-1682, 2010 WL 2991089, at *1 (S.D. Tex.,
July 28, 2010) (natural resources damages and remediation from pollutants
discharged from the Rowan-Midland offshore drilling rig); Mem. Op., Comm'r of
Dep't of Planning and Nat. Res., Dean C. Plaskett v. Esso Standard Oil, S.A.,
No. 1:98-cv-00206-RLF (D.V.I. Oct. 28,2002).
17. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, §§ 101 et seq., 42 U.s.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (2010).
18. The Author has previously argued that environmental special counsel
arrangements are improper under CERCLA as the statute is currently
structured, and proposed legislative reform that will permit the government
reasonable enforcement fees when recovering natural resource damages to
facilitate enforcement of natural resource damage claims. See Julie E. Steiner,
The Illegality Of Contingency-Fee Arrangements when Prosecuting Public
Natural Resource Damage Claims and the Need for Legislative Reform, 32 WM
& MARy ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 169 (2007).
19. Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Civ. No. 05-329-GKF-SAJ, 2008 WL 4832658,
at *1 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 28, 2008).
For a discussion of the private
attorneys involved on the enforcement side, see Edmondson's Lawyers Face
Big Payout in Big Chicken Suit, LEGAL NEWSLINE, Feb. 6, 2008,
http://legalnewsline.comlnewsl207579-edmondsons-Iawyers-face-big-payout-in
big-chicken-suit [hereinafter Chicken Suit).
20. Chicken Suit, supra note 19.
21. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009). On October 16, 2009, the trial court dismissed the Kivalina lawsuit
on grounds that (1) it raises a non-justiciable political question, and (2)
plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Id. at 883. The Village and City of Kivalina
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reminiscent of the successful core conspiracy claims in the
"Big Tobacco" lawsuits, the Kivalina plaintiffs alleged that
members of the energy industry knew about the
environmental effects of greenhouse gases, yet conspired to
create false scientific debate regarding global warming to
deceive the public. 22
Environmental special counselors are a type of
"substitute" private attorney generals who have certain
common characteristics relating to standing, fee structure,
government oversight and litigation goals. 23 First, such
have retained the services of attorneys from two prominent public interest
organizations along with a suite of private law firms as "other counsel,"
including two attorneys who formerly represented major players in the tobacco
litigation context: Stephen Susman of Susman Godfrey LLP and Steve Berman
of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. Id. at 867. The tobacco litigation that
Susman and Berman were involved with ultimately led to the four primary
tobacco companies settling conspiracy charges for over $200 billion. See Tobacco
Master Settlement Agreement, available at http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/msa.php
(last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
22. Complaint at 5, Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (No. C 08
1138 SBA) (averring the defendants knew or should have known their emissions
would impact global warming trends and that they conspired to create a false
scientific debate to deceive the public).
23. To robustly evaluate the desirability of the environmental special
counsel arrangement, this Article identifies certain qualities that characterize
this particular type of enforcement arrangement and places them within a
heuristic framework that helps identifY its structural advantages and
disadvantages.
In so doing, this Article draws from Professor William
Rubenstein's organizational typology in which he maps various categories of
private attorneys general along a continuum that appreciates their
public/private lawyering attributes. Rubenstein, supra note 2. Rubenstein
divides private attorneys general into three types, two of which are important
for purposes of this Article: "substitute" private attorneys general (which, as
will become clear, typifY environmental special counselors) and "supplemental"
private attorneys general (which include citizen suit enforcers). Substitute
private attorneys general perform the same function as the government
attorney general-such attorneys are cloaked with the mantle, and stand in the
shoes of, the attorney general. Rubenstein's examples include the use of David
Boies to try the Microsoft case and the hiring of plaintiffs contingency fee
counsel to recoup state monetary loss attributable to smoking-related illness.
Id. at 2143; see also Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on
Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass
Litigation, 34 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (2000). Substitute private attorneys general
represent the public, are paid an hourlyllodestar or contingent fee and seek
compensation and, secondarily, deterrence. "Supplemental" private attorneys
general, according to Rubenstein, must demonstrate Article III standing as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit. Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 2147.
The supplemental private attorney general, thus, maintains suit because she
can prove de facto injury; it is understood-and transparent to the onlooker
that she pursues her own interests, even in situations where she is motivated
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arrangements occur between governments, with standing to
redress public environmental harm under statutory or
common law public trust or parens patriae authority, and
environmental special counsel who have been delegated
limited power to handle the public action. The actions are
thus prosecuted in the name of the government or
governmental agency. 24
Second, environmental special
counselors are paid with a contingency fee that is withdrawn
from the public's environmental damage award. 25 Third, at
least theoretically, the government continues to oversee its
environmental special counsel proxy. Lastly, environmental
special counselors are motivated by compensation and the
actions implicate large monetary recoveries.
The arrangement is billed as so-called "no cost" litigation
because environmental special counselors fund the costs of
prosecution. Critics, however, suggest that the label "no cost"
is a misnomer because such arrangements often give rise to
costs, such as lost government resources and a diminished
return in damages recovered in the suit. 26
Environmental special counsel arrangements are
materially distinct from citizen suit enforcement.
Environmental special counselors exhibit more public
attributes than their citizen suit brethren. Citizen suit
enforcers are a less public brand of private attorney general
because they, by definition, represent private interests
by public goals. Id. Conversely, the substitute private attorney general does
not need to clear this standing hurdle. Supplemental private attorneys general
represent private clients, but their litigation contributes to the public interest
by supplementing the government's enforcement of the law and policy.
Supplemental private attorneys general are also paid an hourlyllodestar or
contingent fee but as a result of a fee shift, and like substitute private attorneys
general primarily seek compensation and, secondarily, deterrence.
24. Such actions are often styled with the government as a named plaintiff
and the environmental special counselor as agent for the government. See, e.g.,
New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2006); Mem. Op.,
Comm'r of the Dep't of Planning and Nat. Res., Dean C. Plaskett v. Esso
Standard Oil, S.A., No. 1:98-cv-00206-RLF (D.V.1. Oct. 28, 2002).
25. Steiner, supra note 18 at 170-71.
26. See e.g., Adam Liptak, A Deal For the Public: If You Win, You Lose, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9,2007, at AID ("The taxpayers may pay either way. Any recovery
in the case belongs to the state's taxpayers, but Mr. Edmondson has signed a
contract to give a big chunk of it away."); Schwartz et al., supra note 5, at 3
("Contingency fee awards are often misrepresented as coming at no cost to the
public, with no need for government resources. But these contracts are not free.
A fee paid to private lawyers as a result of the litigation is money that would
otherwise fund government services or offset the public'S tax burden.").
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sufficient to withstand Article III particularized standing.
Citizen suit enforcers bring suit in the name of their private
or organizational client, not in the name of the government as
do substitute environmental special counsel enforcers. This
raises an important transparency issue that exists for the
environmental special counselor, but not for the citizen suit
plaintiff. To the onlooker, by virtue of an action styled
"citizen suit plaintiff vs. defendant," the citizen suit is
understood to be spearheaded by a private enforcer.
Environmental special counselors, however, appear like any
other government attorney in actions styled "government vs.
defendant," and thus their personal stake is obscured by a
cloak of government-supplied legitimacy. 27
Moreover,
supplemental citizen suit enforcers are paid by virtue of a fee
shift or by their clients, not from a contingency fee award as
are substitute enforcers. Both supplemental and substitute
enforcers pursue compensation over deterrence. In this way,
both are distinguished from purely public attorneys, who are
salaried and pursue deterrence over compensation.
In a few instances, courts have addressed the legality of
these arrangements. The current trend is to permit such
agreements if adequate supervision by the government
attorneys exists and is expressly provided for in the
Professional Services Contract between the government and
substitute enforcer.
The most thorough vetting of the issues occurred in the
context of the California lead paint litigation. 28 In County of
Santa Clara v. Superior Court, with abatement as the sole
remedy, numerous public entities prosecuted public nuisance
actions against businesses that manufactured lead paint. 29
The public entities were represented by their own
government attorneys as well as by special environmental
counsel on a contingency.3o
Initially, the trial court in the Santa Clara action
invalidated the contingency fee agreement between the
county and its substitute environmental special counselors
27. Because the environmental special counselor's standing is derivative of
the government's standing, substitute enforcement overcomes a difficult hurdle
that exists at the citizen suit enforcement level.
28. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010).
29. See id.
30. [d. at 25.
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under what is now known as the "Clancy doctrine"; this
doctrine posits that such agreements violate the standard of
neutrality required to prosecute public nuisance actions. 31
The trial court reasoned that environmental special
counselors are not, as a practical matter, subject to effective
monitoring.32
The Sixth District Court of Appeal overturned the
superior court. 33
The appellate court rationalized that
ultimate control over the litigation rested with the
government, under its professional service contract between
environmental special counsel and the county. 34 The court
reasoned that environmental special counselors are retained
"only to assist" the litigation.35 Finding no violation of the
standard of neutrality, the appellate court permitted the
agreement. 36
The California Supreme Court 37 agreed with the
appellate court. 38 The court held that the government can
retain environmental special counsel on a contingent fee basis
if a "neutral, conflict-free government attorneyD retain[sl the
power to control and supervise the litigation."39
The California lead paint decision adopted and expanded
upon the rationale of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which
recognized the legality of substitute, contingency fee
enforcement in the context of the Rhode Island lead paint
litigation. 40 The Rhode Island Supreme Court cautiously
31. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 1-00-CV-788657, 2007 WL
1093706, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2007) (Komar, J.). The "Clancy doctrine"
is drawn from the California Supreme Court's decision in People ex rel. Clancy
v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1985), which held that a civil public
nuisance action is among the "class of civil actions that demands the
representative of the government to be absolutely neutral," precluding "the use
in such cases of a contingent fee arrangement." Id. at 352.
32. Atl. Richfield, 2007 WL 1093706, at *1.
33. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 842 (Cal. Ct.
App.2008).
34. Id. at 861.
35. Id. at 848.
36. [d. at 849.
37. At the supreme court level, the legality of the fee was the subject of
significant commentator and amici attention. See, e.g., Law Professors Amici
Brief, supra note 3 (arguing against a blanket prohibition on local government
entities' ability to retain private counsel on a contingency fee basis to assist in
the pursuit of a lead paint abatement public nuisance action).
38. See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010).
39. Id. at 36.
40. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 476 CR.l. 2008).
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acknowledged the legality of the contingency fee agreement
between the Attorney General's office and its environmental
special counsel if the Attorney General maintains "absolute
control" over the litigation, and emphasized that the Attorney
General cannot delegate matters of discretionary decision
making to outside counsel. 41
The California Supreme Court recognized that the
distinction between the substitute contingency fee paid
enforcer and a purely public attorney has greater or lesser
impact on the legality depending upon the nature of the case
and the type of remedy sought. 42 The court's opinion,
however, lacked any developed analysis in this regard.
Rather, the court recognized the issue, and then assumed
that monitoring would cure the problem.

II. ILLUMINATING THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIAL COUNSEL ARRANGEMENT
The relatively sparse vetting of the environmental special
counsel arrangement's propriety has thus far occurred
primarily in the context of judicial opinions. 43
This
framework is limited to addressing whether in the context of
a particular case-such as a lead paint public nuisance
action-absolute neutrality is required by the enforcing
agents and whether monitoring and supervision adequately
cure any actual or perceived self-interested behavior by the
substitute enforcer. 44 This question oflegality leaves entirely
unexplored the greater policy issue of whether these
arrangements are socially desirable.
The goal of this Part is to explore these policy issues in
greater detail through the lens of whether substitute private
augmentation accomplishes public enforcement goals in a
manner that optimizes social utility.
Viewing the
arrangement through this lens can (1) provide greater
illumination about whether environmental special counsel
arrangements can achieve certain kinds of remedies as
effectively as public enforcers, (2) better articulate the
nuances of the costs and benefits when enforcement shifts
41. [d.
42. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 32-33.
43. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 28, 31, 33; cases cited infra notes 66,
68; see also Steiner, supra note 18.
44. See cases cited supra notes 28, 31, 33; cases cited infra notes 66, 68
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from a salaried public attorney to a contingency fee paid,
quasi-public enforcer, and (3) further address the cost
mitigation potential of monitoring. Part A addresses the
benefits of the arrangement and Part B addresses the costs of
the arrangement. Part III balances these factors.
A. Benefits of the Environmental Special Counsel
Arrangement
There is significant social utility to the environmental
special counsel arrangement. First, the arrangement can
promote social efficiency by achieving greater deterrence than
a purely public enforcement system. Deterrence is optimized
through heightened detection and/or through enhanced
penalty recovery because it forces violators to more fully
internalize the social costs of their aberrant behavior. 45
Commentators credit private enforcement as an important
mechanism that uncovers and pursues tort liability, thus
optimizing deterrence. 46 Such supplementation is desirable
45. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION 232 (1987). Other commentators, however, argue that
entrepreneurs in fact provide little to no practical detection function. They
argue that such agents "piggyback" off the government enforcement action
wherever possible and do little independent investigation. See, e.g., Michael S.
Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TuL. L. REV. 339,
375 (1990) (recognizing private citizen suit enforcers tend to piggyback off
government's search and detection efforts); Bryant Garth et al., The Institution
of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives From an Empirical Study of Class
Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 374-78 (1988) (finding that attorneys
who were dependent on fees tended to piggyback their filings of private
antitrust and securities cases upon government-initiated investigations and
litigation).
46. See, e.g., Greve, supra note 45, at 375. Interestingly, however, while
private enforcers generally tend to piggyback on the government's detection
efforts, Professor Coffee has noted that sometimes the converse situation arises:
[W]idespread price fixing in the gypsum wall board industry was first
revealed in a private treble damage action; later, the government began
its own investigations. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 383 F.
Supp. 462,465 (1974). Another obvious example was the government's
lengthy (and ultimately unsuccessful) prosecution of IBM. For years,
the government's attorneys piggybacked on the work of the private
plaintiffs (chiefly, Control Data) whose more experienced attorneys
undertook the major discovery and document review work. Although
the government lost, Control Data obtained a favorable settlement. See
Brill, What to Tell Your Friends About IBM, AMERICAN LAWYER, April,
1982, at 12, col. l.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 227 n.27 (1983);
see also, e.g., THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT
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because it requires those who wrong society to disgorge their
illicit profits, and it serves to detect violations that might
evade regulatory capture. 47
To the extent that the arrangement accomplishes
enforcement that in fact translates to restorative activity,
then the arrangement also facilitates the goal of restorative
compensation. This can take the form of money that is in fact
applied toward restorative activity or equitable remedy. As
discussed in more detail below, however, the environmental
special counselor's incentive to monetize the damage award
can potentially be more of a cost than a benefit where
equitable damages are available because the equitable
character of the damage award may best suit the public's
environmental interest. 48
Private enforcement can lead to heightened deterrence by
augmenting government enforcement resources.
This
augments the enforcement power of governments that lack
the structural or fiscal enforcement resources to effectively
enforce by privatizing enforcement resources. 49
Importantly, the environmental special counsel
arrangement also can facilitate social. utility by advancing
social equity. 50 Environmental equity goals are advanced by
LAw 5 (2003) ("[PJrivate attorneys general, not government regulators,
discovered that [Bridgestonel]Firestone tires mounted on Fort Explorers caused
hundreds of rollover accidents due to tread separation.").
47. See, e.g., John S. Moot, Compliance Programs, Penalty Mitigation and
the FERC, 29 ENERGY L. J. 547 (2008); Marleen O'Connor, Toward a More
Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(B), 58 FORD.
L. REV. 309 (1989) (discussing efficiency in context of insider trading
enforcement); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence versus Cooperation and the
Evolving Theory ofEnvironmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998).
48. See infra Part ILB.l.
49. While professional service retainer agreements routinely recite the need
for such resource augmentation, governments vary in the degree to which they
can in fact provide such structural support and environmental expertise. See
Steiner, supra note 18, at 209 n.177 ("[TJhe underlying assumption that states,
territories and tribes are unable to bring such action in the first instance is
not always true. Most states have functional environmental enforcement
programs staffed with trained, specialty attorneys."
(citing U.S.
Dep't. of Justice, U.S. Att'y Manual 5-12.523 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiaJeading_room/usamltitle5112menv.htm#5
12.523)).
50. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbi, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in
International Environmental Law, 76 TuL. L. REV. 843 (2002); G.F. Maggio,
Inter / Intra Generational Equity: Current Applications Under International Law
For Promoting the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources, 4 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 161 (1997).
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mitigating inferior enforcement power that disproportionately
impacts socio-economically disadvantaged groups. 51 From an
environmental justice perspective, environmental special
counsel can provide a particular benefit for socio-economically
disadvantaged groups who are disproportionately impacted
Additionally, the arrangement can
by contamination.52
equalize enforcement power for sovereigns-such as some
Native American tribes-that suffer injury but lack the
structural and fiscal capability to enforce. In this way, the
arrangement facilitates environmental justice for poorer
communities that have been affected by environmental
contamination.
Moreover, the arrangement advances
intergenerational equity concerns by providing environmental
recompense that will help ensure sustainability of the
resource for future generations. 53

B. Costs of the Environmental Special Counsel Arrangement
The environmental special counsel arrangement,
nevertheless, implicates numerous costs that to some degree
offset the arrangement's positive social utility. These costs
are best conceived as ones of agency54 that result in a
misalignment of interests between the government enforcer
and its substitute environmental special counsel proxy
enforcer.
Because the arrangement introduces self-interested
entrepreneurial behavior into public enforcement,55 it creates
the potential for suboptimal deterrence and diminished public
compensation. This potential results from a heightened
misalignment between the government's interests and the
51. See, e.g., Drumbi supra note 50; Maggio supra note 50.
52. See, e.g., Drumbi supra note 50; Maggio supra note 50.
53. Professors Bach and Weston make a compelling argument that the
present generation has significant legal obligations to safeguard resources for
future generations. See Tracy Bach & Burns H. Weston, Recalibrating the Law
of Humans with the Laws of Nature: Climate Change, Human Rights, and
Intergenerational Justice (Vt. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 10·06, 2009).
54. See, e.g., D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC
OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS

24 (1991); H. W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys-Whom Shall They Serve?,
61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 135 (1998).
55. Of course, it is possible that even salaried public officials might act in
self-interested ways to gain higher salaries, more prominent titles, or for a
variety of other reasons.
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interests of its environmental special counselor proxy.
Intentionally or not, as a result of the fee structure
incentives, entrepreneurial agents may pursue their own self
interest to the derogation of the public's environmental
interest. 56
There are numerous ways in which that
misalignment manifests.
1. Fee Structure That Creates a Preference For Monetary
Awards Over Equitable Relief
One way in which the misalignment is particularly acute
relates to the environmental special counselor's incentive to
monetize environmental damage awards, even when money is
not the preferred form of relief from the standpoint of the
public's environmental interest. Environmental enforcement
often provides for equitable relief as a potential damage
remedy. 57 When environmental injury has occurred, the goal
is not simply deterrence-in which case money can readily
substitute for its equitable equivalent-but the optimal goal
is instead to ensure that the character of the remedy achieves
both deterrence and environmental recompense. 58 In the
environmental context, where the relief is not solely limited
to monetary civil penalty, equitable relief is often the
56. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the
Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 531-33 (1978); Coffee, supra note 46;
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement ofLaw Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 726 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding
the Plaintiffs Attorney]; Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency,
Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975);
Louis Kaplow, Private versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
371 (1986); John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90
YALE L.J. 473 (1981); Mitchell & Schwartz, Theoretical Implications of
Contingent Legal Fees, 12 Q. REV. ECON. & BuS. 69 (1972); Steven Shavell, The
Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982).
57. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988). But see Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust
Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 699 (2006) (discussing relieflimitations).
58. See Charlie Garlow, Environmental Recompense, 1 APP. L.J. 1 (2002).
Professor David A. Dana has urged, "the public interest that the [Attorney
Generals] purportedly seek to advance ... will not always be best served by
maximizing the states' monetary relief.
Sometimes public interest
considerations dictate ... focusing on nonmonetary relief more than monetary
relief." Dana, supra note 7, at 323.
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preferred measure of damages. 59 It is the actual remediation
of contamination and restoration of injured resources that
fully compensates the public.60
When the enforcer is a salaried public official, the
restorative compensation goal can more readily be achieved
than through substitute environmental special counselor
enforcement. The reason is inextricably linked to the fee
structure of the players involved and the consequent
incentives that the structures create. 61 The government
attorney is a salaried official whose fee is not formally tied to
the damage award. The environmental special counselor, on
the other hand, derives a fee from the damage award and is
thus interested in monetizing that award to maximize
personal gain. 62 Rather than planting trees or remediating a
spill, the environmental special counselor is personally
interested in the monetary value of that construct to draw a
contingency fee. Once the damage award has been depleted
to pay the contingency fee, it is possible the remainder of the
recovery will not yield the same amount of restorative activity
as would be the case if only a salaried enforcer were at the
helm of the enforcement action. 63
Even though a purely public enforcer might act in self
interested ways, the salary structure for the public enforcer
creates a superior alignment of interests with the public than
with one who derives a contingency fee from the public's
bounty.64 When the public enforcer outsources its function to
its environmental special counsel proxy, it shifts from a
salaried enforcer whose personal incentives are better aligned
with the public's interest in obtaining equitable relief, to an
enforcer whose personal incentives are to monetize the
damage award where the public's environmental interest
might be better served by equitable remedy.
59. See, e.g., William Murray Tabb, Reconsidering the Application of Laches
in Environmental Litigation, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 407-08 (1990).
Courts have recognized the preference for equitable relief. See, e.g., Magnolia
Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475, 486 (La. 1991) (Lemmon, J.,
concurring).
60. See Garlow, supra note 58.
61. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 56; Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a
Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champertry, 71 CHI.
KENT L.R. 625 (1995).
62. See Steiner, supra note 18.
63. [d.

64. See Rubenstein, supra note 2.
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2. Costs and Difficulty ofEffective Monitoring
Under the environmental special counsel arrangement,
the government, which would otherwise have funded the
enforcement efforts through a budgeted, general treasury
allocation, shifts most of these costs to environmental special
counsel. The government continues to incur monitoring costs,
however.65 The public enforcer, at least theoretically, screens
the foundation for filing the initial complaint, oversees the
litigation, and reviews or co-signs most court filings.
Arguably, because the Attorney General remains
involved in the action in an oversight capacity, she is able to
effectively monitor her environmental special counsel to
ensure the result comports with the public interest. Because
the Attorney General can supervise the environmental special
counsel and can veto actions by environmental special
counsel, she can check against actions that are, or appear,
opportunistic, or otherwise do not comport with the public
interest. 66
Indeed, as discussed in Part I, this argument resonates
with courts that have examined and upheld the legality of
such contingency fee agreements. 67
The Rhode Island
Supreme Court, for example, discussed its awareness and
concern about the potential for self-interested behavior on the
part of environmental special counsel, but ultimately upheld
the legality of the agreements because the court stated that
the public enforcer's oversight and monitoring of outside
counsel provide an adequate safeguard. 68
65. See e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public
Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 167,176 n.43 (1985).
66. Indeed, the ability of the government attorney to remain involved in
these actions in a supervisory oversight capacity has been the pivotal factor that
courts have relied upon in upholding the legality of these arrangements. See
Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010); Cnty. of Santa
Clara v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Lead
Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 476 (R.I. 2008). But see Cnty. of Santa Clara v. AU.
Richfield, No. 1-00-CV-788657, 2007 WL 1093706, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4,
2007) (Komar, J.) (invalidating agreements partially on ground that they are
difficult to effectively monitor).
67. Id.
68. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 480. The court stated:
Attorneys who choose to litigate under contingent fee agreements
understandably often have motives that, in whole or in part, are
monetary in nature. Such motivation is qualitatively different from the
more pristine considerations that should guide the Attorney General's
decision-making. While we do not look upon contingent fee agreements

870

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:51

The notion of effective monitoring, of course, assumes
that the government is in fact maintaining some basic level of
monitoring. One must question, however, how a government
that justifies the agreement on the grounds that it lacks
sufficient resources to provide enforcement as a basic matter
can effectively monitor the special counsel agreement at a
level sufficient to curb agent opportunism. Thus, it is
possible that some of the governments that are most in
financial need of this enforcement arrangement are those
least capable of effectively monitoring the environmental
special counselor.
Another way to conceive of the problem is that the
outsourcing arrangement creates a moral hazard that can
result in inadequate oversight by the government monitor.
The term "moral hazard" originates in the insurance arena
and references the idea that insurance causes the insured to
alter her behavior. 69 As applied to the environmental special
counselor arrangement, the moral hazard argument is that
the contingency fee arrangement, because it shifts the costs
and risks of the litigation from the government to a private
entrepreneur, acts like insurance. This engenders a moral
hazard problem because the government, which has now
"insured" its litigation risk, might be more risk tolerant in
terms of litigation strategy and more lax in its oversight of
environmental special counsel. 70 Thought of in this way, the
with a jaundiced eye due to the fact that they inherently implicate
personal profit-making as a motivation, it is precisely because of the
possibility of that motivating factor having an influence on decisions
made by contingent fee counsel that it is utterly imperative that
absolute primacy be accorded at all times to the decision-making role of
the Attorney General when he or she has entered into an agreement
with contingent fee counsel. Such absolute primacy is necessary in
order to ensure that the profit-making motivation is always
subordinated to the Attorney General's "common law duty to represent
the public interest."
[d. (internal citations omitted).
69. Lawrence Summers, Beware the Moral Hazard Fundamentalists,
FIN. TIMES ECONOMISTS' FORUM, (Sept. 24, 2007, 10:21 AM GMT)
http://blogs.ft.comleconomistsforuml2007/09Ibeware-the-morahtm1.
70. In other contexts, commentators and litigants challenged the legality of
contingency fee arrangements on behalf of the public on the grounds that such
arrangements raise moral hazards. See Brief of the Nat'l Paint & Coatings
Assoc., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Commonwealth v.
Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 24 EAP 2009 (Pa. Aug. 11, 2009), available at
http://druganddevicelaw.netlJanssen%20materials/Janssen%20Paint%20Amicu
s%20brief.pdf; Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem With
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government might be willing to take greater litigation risks
and provide fewer monitoring safeguards because it is not
fronting the costs or human resources. Some of the "red flags"
identified in other analogous contexts as potential signals of
weak oversight and monitoring exist in the environmental
special counsel enforcement context. 71
There is a concern that, even though the government
oversees the litigation, it might not be possible to adequately
monitor and safeguard against attorney opportunism as a
practical matter. 72
Even where settlement offers are
monitored, the environmental special counsel typically had
dealings, and may have sent bargaining signals, that
influence formal settlement offers.
Moreover, at some juncture, the monitoring level is so
extreme, and its attendant public costs so high, that the
Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 281 (2007) (applying moral hazard analogy to public-private
prosecution of Qui Tam).
71. Professor Coffee suggests a pattern that reflects that the attorney
entrepreneur marketed the case to the client, rather than a scenario in which
the client identified an enforcement need and then sought out the attorney,
serves as a "red flag" that there may be weak oversight by the principal of the
agent. Coffee, supra note 46, at 220, 229.
72. The California Superior Court identified this as its central concern when
it struck down the contingency fee arrangement agreed upon between
environmental special counsel and the Attorney General in the California lead
paint lawsuit:
[Als a practical matter, it would be difficult to determine (a) how much
control the government attorneys must exercise in order for the
contingent fee arrangement with outside counsel [tol be permissible, (b)
what types of decisions the government attorneys must retain control
over, e.g., settlement or major strategy decisions, or also day-to-day
decisions involving discovery and so forth, and (c) whether the
government attorney have been exercising such control throughout the
litigation or whether they have passively or blindly accepted
recommendations, decisions, or actions by outside counsel. . .. Given
the inherent difficulties of determining whether or to what extent the
prosecution of this nuisance action might or will be influenced by the
presence of outside counsel operating under a contingent fee
arrangement, outside counsel must be precluded from operating under
a contingent fee agreement, regardless of the government attorneys'
and outside attorneys' well-meaning intentions to have all decisions in
this litigation made by the government attorneys.
Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 1-00-CV-788657, 2007 WL
1093706, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2007) (internal citation omitted). This
opinion was reversed by the appellate court, Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior
Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), and the appellate court was
upheld by the state supreme court. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235
P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010).
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outsourcing is no longer justifiable. 73 Striking an optimal
monitoring balance is essential to ensure that the monitoring
carries positive social utility.

3. Unregulated and Opaque Contracting
The environmental special counsel enforcement
arrangement is vulnerable to unchecked "pay to play"
cronyism.
In its present unregulated form, the
environmental special counsel contract can be awarded
without any form of open or competitive process. Sources cite
evidence that environment special counsel arrangements are
in fact awarded to attorneys who have financial ties to certain
Attorney General's personal or political allies. 74
Transparency is critical to ensure the integrity of the
arrangement. These actions are styled in the name of the
government. Thus it is not apparent to the onlooker that
there is substitute enforcement at the helm of the litigation.
While certain entities have begun the important public
watchdog function of tracking and publishing campaign
contribution links between Attorney Generals and
73. See Stewart Jay, The Dilemma of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 813, 872 (1989).
74. For example, there is evidence that plaintiffs law firm Motley Rice
contributed to Attorney General Patrick Lynch's campaign before he decided to
re-file the Rhode Island lead paint nuisance abatement case. John O'Brien,
Public Nuisance Bringing AGs and Lawyers Together, Attorney Says, LEGAL
NEWSLINE, Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.legalnewsline.comlnewsl216331-public
nuisance-bringing-ags-and-Iawyers-together-attorney-says; see also Links to
Okla. AG Land Lawyers Contingency Prize: Big Chicken, LEGAL NEWSLINE,
Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.legalnewsline.comlnewsl207875-links-to-okla.-ag
land-Iawyers-contingency-prize-big-chicken (reporting links between Oklahoma
Attorney General Drew Edmondson and Tulsa-based law firm Riggs, Abney,
Neal, Turpen, Orginson & Lewis, who were awarded the environmental special
counsel contract in the "Big Chicken" lawsuit: "In the years 2001-2004, one
researcher discovered 15 attorneys at Riggs Abney donated almost $50,000 to
Edmondson's re-election campaigns. Partners M. David Riggs and Mike Turpen
were Edmondson's largest individual donors within the firm, giving $8,600 and
$8,100 respectively."). This occurred just prior to receiving Riggs Abney's
receipt of the environmental special counsel arrangement in the "Big Chicken"
lawsuit, which was filed in 2005. Such alliances and claims of no-competition
cronyism have been raised in other private entrepreneurial special counsel
contexts. See, e.g., Editorial, The Pay-to-Sue Business: Write a Check, Get a No
Bid Contract To Litigate for the State, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2009, at A14
(reporting plaintiffs lawyer F. Kenneth Bailey made repeated donations to
Governor Ed Rendell's 2006 re-election campaign in the months preceding the
state's provision of a lucrative no-bid contingency fee contract to sue Janssen
Pharmaceuticals).
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environmental special counsel on their websites, these efforts
are neither uniform nor comprehensive. 75 Such entities,
moreover, are typically representative of business-centric
political action groups 76 and thus lack the neutrality element
that will make public dissemination of such information a
trusted resource or an appropriate political check on the
system.

4. Agent Vulnerability to Litigation Blackmail
The threat of collusive settlements is amplified in the
environmental special counsel context. 77 First, defendants
can use the threat of restorative remedial settlement offers to
their strategic advantage. Defendants that might otherwise
have offered more costly equitable settlements might instead
offer less costly monetary settlement offers to send a signal to
environmental special counsel that if they do not accept the
monetary offer, the defendants' next offer will be equitable. 78
Thus, the environmental enforcement entrepreneur might
collusively settle "on the cheap" to avoid the future "threat" of
equitable settlement. 79
75. See,
e.g.,
INSTITUTE
FOR
LEGAL
REFORM,
http://instituteforlegalreform.com
(last
visited
Jan.
24,
2011);
LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, http://legalnewsline.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2011);
POINTOFLAW.COM: INFORMATION AND OPINION ON THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM,
http://pointoflaw.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
76. For example, the American Tort Reform Association, the United
States Chamber of Commerce and its legal policy arm, the Institute for Legal
Reform, to some extent track and report on contributions made by outside
counsel to state Attorney Generals. See, e.g., JOHN FUND, INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, CASH IN, CONTRACTS OUT: THE RELATIONSIDP BETWEEN STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR (2004), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.comlget_ilr_doc.php?id=942. The American
Tort Reform Association draws its membership from the petroleum, medical,
insurance and manufacturing industry, among others, and is dedicated to tort
and liability reform. AMERICAN TORT REFORM AsS'N, http://www.atra.orglabout
(last visited Jan. 24, 2011). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce represents
primarily small businesses along with state and local chambers and industry
association and asserts as it core mission the "free enterprise before Congress,
the White House, regulatory agencies, the courts, the court of public opinion,
and governments around the world."
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.uschamber.comlabout (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). The Institute for
Legal Reform is the policy arm of the Chamber of Commerce. Id.
77. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 56, at 677
(noting class action vulnerable to "collusive settlements ... benefit plaintiffs
attorneys rather than their clients.").
78. Id.
79. Sophisticated defendants know they are dealing with an entrepreneur
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Second, environmental special counselors are particularly
vulnerable to a type of personalized, strategic litigation
attack because they may be the targets of motions to
disqualify or void the fee arrangement on a variety of
grounds. 80 Defendants have pursued such avenues in a
number of environmental special counsel actions, including
motions to disqualify on grounds of a statutory conflict
between CERCLA and the contingency fee arrangement, and
challenges to the legality of the fee arrangement on due
process and ethical grounds. 81 The potential to use the threat
of a disqualification or fee challenge motion to the defendant's
strategic advantage may lead to the possibility of
environmental special counselors settling a case to avoid the
threat of an adverse outcome.
Third, litigation-savvy defendants can strategically wage
an early and aggressive "pleadings and paper war" with the
goal of exacting such an extreme cost on the environmental
special counselor that the entrepreneur decides that her
personal profit is not worth the investment of future
enforcement costS. 82 While settling at an early juncture
might make sense from the entrepreneur's litigation costwhose incentive is to invest as little as possible in litigation costs and maximize
recovery. ld. at 690.
80. See, e.g., Defendant U.S.' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike
Demand for Attorneys' Fees, New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d.
1237 (D.N.M. 2004) (No. 99-1118-LFG), 2000 WL 35574675; Transcript of
Hearing, N.J. Soc'y for Envtl. & Econ. Dev. v. Campbell, No. MER-L-343-04
(N.J. Super. Ct. June 18, 2004), reprinted in William H. Hyatt, Jr. et al.,
Natural Resource Damages: New Developments at the State Level, in
HAzARDous SUBSTANCES, SITE REMEDIATION, AND ENFORCEMENT 281, 365 ex.E
(ALI-ABA, 2005).
81. See, e.g., Defendant U.S.' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike
Demand for Attorneys' Fees at 11, New Mexico, 322 F. Supp. 2d. 1237 (No. 99
1118-LFG) (arguing that contingency fee representation is impermissible for
natural resource damage actions under the plain language of CERCLA's use
restriction and the "American Rule" prohibiting recovery of attorney's fees
absent an express legislative provision permitting recovery of such fees); Order,
Commonwealth v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 24 EAP 2009 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17,
201O) (denying Motion to Disqualify outside counsel); Brief of the United States
as Amicus Curiae Regarding Federal Preemption of Territorial Law Regarding
Use of Natural Resource Damage Recovery, Comm'r of the Dep't of Planning &
Natural Res., Dean C. Plaskett v. Esso Standard Oil, S.A., No. 1:98-cv-00206
RLF (D.V.1. Feb. 14, 2005) (arguing that CERCLA's use restriction constitutes
the only permissible uses of natural resource damage recoveries by a trustee
and the use restriction preempts conflicting state, territorial or common laws).
82. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 56, at
718-20.
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benefit standpoint, it might not further enforcement policy
goals.

5. Over-Deterrence of "Deep Pocket" Defendants and
Under-Deterrence ofLesser Capitalized Defendants
Another troubling cost relates to particularized
enforcement by substitute private enforcers who may over
enforce against deep pocket defendants and under-enforce
against those with limited capital.83 This can frustrate sound
environmental enforcement because the least capitalized
entities can cause substantial environmental harm by virtue
of their operations.
Public enforcers are better suited to pursue enforcement
against lesser-capitalized environmental violators than
substitute environmental special counselors. Salaried public
enforcers are better able to justify using treasury-allocated
litigation funds to pursue less capitalized environmental
violators because, even if those entities cannot fully
compensate for injury, the enforcement efforts can achieve
deterrence.
Because environmental special counselors
personally fund litigation, however, they are motivated to
only pursue sufficiently capitalized violators who present a
potential payoff that justifies the enforcement costs.
6. Conflicts ofInterest
Another significant problem with the retention of
substitute environmental special counselors on behalf of
public enforcers is that many lawyers who seek to fill this
quasi-public role are simultaneously members of the private
plaintiffs' tort bar.84 As such, they have divided loyalties
between their private tort clients and their public tort clients.
Recognizing the public/private client conflict of interest
inherent in the State's retention of private attorneys, has led
Professor David Dana to question whether there should be a
blanket prohibition on outside counsel concurrently
representing private tort plaintiffs.85
Professor Dana
83. See Amanda M. Rose, The Multiplier Approach to Securities Fraud
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010) (private
enforcement in context of securities fraud); see also Richard A. Bierschbach &
Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1743 (2005).
84. Dana, supra note 7, at 323.
85. Id.
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recognizes, however, that such a requirement would be
difficult to meaningfully enforce and can have the undesirable
result of eliminating qualified entrepreneurs from the pool of
potential outside lawyers available to handle the action. 86 A
transparent and competitive bidding structure for the
professional service contract will ensure that there is a pool of
entrepreneurs involved in the selection and will subject the
resulting contract to political check.

7. Perception Costs
Lastly, there are perception costs associated with the
environmental special counsel arrangement. The public
perception of government and of the legal profession may
deteriorate as a result of the appearance of opportunistic
behavior by the guardians of the public's environmental
trust. 87 The public may view the arrangement as reflecting
entrepreneurial greed by those tasked with safeguarding the
public fisc. 88 The public may further question the integrity of
the legal profession's ability to adequately self-regulate the
ethical conduct of its members.
On the other hand, the perception might be that it is
beneficial to the public's interest. 89 The public might be
inclined to favor any enforcement over low or no enforcement
thus perceiving the arrangement in a positive light.

III.

BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SUBSTITUTE
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

While less numerous than the costs, this Article posits
that the arrangement's benefits deserve more weight and are
more significant than the costs.
This is because the
arrangement helps to fill a gap in enforcement coverage.
In environmental law, the government holds ecological
resources in trust for the benefit of the public. 90 Significantly,
86. Id.
87. See Lester Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of
Fiduciary Protection: Ethics 2000's Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1181 (2003).
88. Id.
89. See Marc Galanter, Symposium, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhold: The
Contingency Fee and its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457,458-59 (1998).
90. Mary C. Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to
Safeguard the Environment For Present and Future Generations (Part I):
Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43 (2009);
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governments are often the only viable entities with standing
to sue for environmental redress. 91 Yet, governments may
not detect violations. 92
Moreover, where detected,
governments may lack the resources 93 or for other reasons
choose not to enforce. 94 What then happens when the public
has suffered an environmental injury, but the government for
whatever reason does not detect or enforce on behalf of the
public?
If there is a violation, and governments for whatever
reason do not enforce, citizen suits provide a certain degree of
enforcement augmentation,95 but are, unfortunately, an
incomplete gap filler. The Article III standing requirement
and up front funding involved in prosecuting such suits are
significant hurdles to citizen suit plaintiffs.96 These tend to
be costly, complex actions. As a result, citizen suits are often
brought by public interest groups that have curried a
substantial membership base from which to draw for
purposes of institutional standing. 97 These organizations also
have the civic motivation and limited revenue to selectively
prosecute such actions.
But organizational citizen suit
plaintiffs "cherry pick" which cases to bring, and face difficult
Mary C. Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for the Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a
Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL L. 91 2009).
91. See Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the
Attorney General, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 57, 112 (2005); Deborah G.
Musiker, The Public Trust and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in
Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 87 (1995).
92. Thompson, supra note 11, at 190 ("[M]any environmental violations are
difficult or prohibitively expensive for the government to detect.").
93. Id. at 191 ("[Tlhe enforcement wings of both federal and state
environmental agencies are often woefully understaffed and underfunded.").
94. Id. ("[Plolitical considerations and institutional structure may often lead
agencies to ignore violations that are known and appropriate to prosecute.").
Monopolistic public enforcement, however, might not yield more optimal
deterrence than a scheme augmented by private lawyers. Agency interests, and
inefficiencies like regulatory capture and bureaucracy might misalign the
private and public interest to a greater extent than under a regime of private
enforcement. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1304 nn.9-10 (2008).
95. Thompson, supra note 11, at 191.
96. See Jeffrey Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control
Laws: The Citizen Suit Provisions, SD88 ALI-ABA 819 (1999); Lynn Wright
and Steven D. Schell, Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: Litigation Strategies and
Defenses, SE98 ALI-ABA 1087 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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hurdles to surmount with regard to Article III standing.
Individual members of the public who might also bring citizen
suits tend to lack the funding or motivation to prosecute such
actions, and also face standing hurdles. Finally, while most
major environmental statutes contain citizen suit
provisions,98 citizen suit provisions do not exist for all types of
claims.
When violations occur, and neither the government nor a
citizen brings an enforcement action, then there is an
undesirable gap in enforcement coverage. 99 Yet, an effective
environmental legal regime should, to the maximal extent
possible, catch and enforce legal violations. 100 To the extent
governments cannot enforce and citizen suits are neither
available nor brought, the legal regime should provide
meaningful enforcement augmentation mechanisms. 101
98. See ENVTL. LAw INST., A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO USING FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAwS TO SECURE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2002), available
at
http://www .epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/reports/annual-project
reports/citizen-!;Uide_ej.pdf.
99. Take the example of a contaminated groundwater aquifer that serves as
a public potable water supply. If the government does not enforce against those
who contributed to the contamination, and ensure that the damage award
accomplishes resource restoration, those residents who rely upon the resource
will have no ability to obtain redress but for citizen suits. If they cannot afford
to front the costs of the citizen suit-and these are expert driven, costly
claims-and if no institutional plaintiff with organizational standing steps in to
take up their cause, these residents will continue to suffer ecological harm.
Public health is jeopardized, and, significantly, future generations who will be
affected by this contamination have no ability to seek redress. Such redress is
about actual restoration of the aquifer, not about generating money for some
alternative government expenditure.
100. Thompson, supra note 11, at 189 ("Trustworthy compliance statistics are
difficult to obtain. Because regulatees that violate environmental laws have an
obvious incentive to disguise violations, reported compliance rates can grossly
overestimate actual compliance. State governments also sometimes massage
compliance data to make their environmental programs look more successful
than they actually are. Yet even reported rates reveal a significant level of
noncompliance. EPA data for various periods in the 1990s, for example, showed
that nearly twenty percent of major industrial, municipal, and federal permit
holders under the Clean Water Act were in 'significant noncompliance' with
their perII;lit requirements for at least one calendar quarter. Studies by the
General Accounting Office and various independent researchers have reported
ever lower rates of compliance with many environmental laws, including the
Clean Air Act, hazardous waste disposal laws, and safe drinking water
standards.").
101. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental
Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999) (arguing for theory of optimal
environmental governance that maximizes the social welfare delivered by
regulatory structures by minimizing market failure harm and loss, constrained
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Substitute environmental special counsel enforcement
provides a useful gap filling augmentation because it provides
standing derivative of the government's parens patriae or
public trust standing, thus avoiding the Article III standing
hurdle that hampers citizen suit enforcement. While, as
presently structured, environmental special counsel
arrangements require up front funding and thus, too, will
lead to "cherry picking," certain structural reforms that better
facilitate fee awards can make it a more palatable
arrangement to the private enforcer.
Finally, the
arrangement permits a greater array of claims to be brought
than citizen suits, which do not exist for all enforcement
claims.
There should be a preference for government-led
enforcement where feasible. Governments are best positioned
to control uniform environmental policy, and environmental
enforcement often involves complicated overlapping
trusteeship issues that require government coordination.
Such a government-led enforcement preference is built into
environmental law and incorporated in citizen suit
provisions. 102 But, as a gap-filler, there should be privatized
enforcement to ensure maximal redress of violations. Citizen
suit enforcement is a useful, but incomplete, augmentation
scheme.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORMATIVE APPROACH

This Part determines that there are structural reforms
that would still accomplish substitute enforcement
augmentation while mitigating some of the more substantial
costs involved with the contingency fee arrangement. While
this Article does not attempt to frame the precise parameters

by such values as justice, liberty and equity).
102. Thompson, supra note 11, at 193 ("When Congress first authorized
citizen suits, supporters and opponents alike worried about the potential for
overlapping actions by private and public prosecutors-a problem that had
plagued both the antitrust and securities fields where coextensive public
prosecutions and private compensation actions were permissible. Congress
agreed that exclusive public prosecution was to be preferred over dual
prosecution. As a result, citizen suit provisions require plaintiffs to provide the
federal government, the relevant state, and the alleged violator with sixty-days
notice [sic] of the asserted violation. If the government commences a civil or
criminal action or, under some statutes, an administrative enforcement
proceeding, a citizen suit cannot be filed.").
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of an appropriate structure-a highly complex undertaking
worthy of its own article-three potential reforms are worth
consideration: (1) an open and competitive bidding process;
(2) a fee-shifting mechanism to provide for attorneys' fees on
top of, not drawn from, the damage award; and (3) better
controls on the monitoring process.
First, an open and competitive bidding process provides
transparency and thus subjects the arrangement and its
actors to a political check on the process. 103 The public
service procurement literature reflects that competitive
bidding facilitates prudent and economical use of public
money. 104 Competition can facilitate the acquisition of legal
services at the lowest cost and highest quality. 105 An open
process, moreover, guards against corruption and
favoritism. 106
Arguments against including legal services within the
competitive process primarily focus on the fact that
professional service contracts call for the services of highly
specialized and skilled individuals. 107 The concern is that
forced competition may lead to the undesirable result that the
so-called "least competent contractor" may be awarded the
contract simply because she bids the lowest.
Thus, while there should be an open and competitive
process, there should not be a requirement that governments
accept the lowest bid. Rather, the amount of the bid is but
one factor that governments can rely upon in selecting a
desired outside counsel arrangement. The transparency in
this open procurement process to some degree tempers the
concern that this type of arrangement circumvents
democratic checks. This system is in keeping with the so
103. Leah Godesky, Note, State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee
Arrangements: An Affront to the Neutrality Doctrine?, 42 COL. J. LAw & SOC.
POL'y 587 (2002).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. While governments have overwhelmingly enacted some type of
legislative preference for government procurement contracts by competitive
bidding process, the federal government and many state jurisdictions exclude
professional legal service contracts from legislative procurement mandates. See
e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 5 (2006) (excluding professional contracts). Although the
federal government does not include it within the procurement provisions, as
discussed earlier, it currently bans such contracts by Executive Order. See
Exec. Order No. 13,433, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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called "beauty pageant"108 requests for professional services,
which are increasingly popular with clients who solicit
competitive service arrangements from law firms. 109
A second reform would structure the fee award as a fee
shift that is on top of, not drawn from, the damage award. llO
This fee shifting mechanism mitigates, but does not fully
cure, the potential for self-interest driven enforcement. It
does, however, temper the most significant type of cost
involved with contingency fee prosecuted environmental
action enforcement-the potential to favor monetary over
restorative damage recovery.lll The fee can be structured in
many ways including one that is determined as a percentage
of the value of the recovery (even if the recovery is equitable),
so as to retain the character of the contingency
arrangement. 112 By shifting the fee, the damage award more
fully shifts the costs of pollution to the defendant.
Third, there should be adequate controls on the
monitoring process. At the very least, these controls should
include a public enforcement "point person" who remains
consistently involved in the litigation, and retains complete
control of decision-making and veto power over the substitute
environmental counselor. 113 Furthermore, any defendant
108. Kenneth D. Agran, The Treacherous Path to the Dianwnd-Studded
Tiara: Ethical Dilemmas in Legal Beauty Contests, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1307, 1308 (1996) ("A legal beauty contest is a competitive interviewing process
in which a client seeking legal representation (often a major corporation looking
for outside counsel) interviews several different law firms for the same job.
Such contests have become more common in recent years due to rising legal
costs and increasing specialization in the legal profession. Would-be clients use
beauty contests to find the best firm to suit their needs, while at the same time
reducing legal costs by encouraging law firms to compete for their business.").
109. These processes have been alternatively referred to as "beauty contests"
or, in their more neutral term, "Requests for Proposals (RFPs)" for legal
services. Larry Smith, Recent Flurry of Beauty Contests Show Increased
Sophistication, 11 No. 16 OF COUNSEL 1 (Aug. 17, 1992).
110. See Steiner, supra note 18 (arguing for fee shift on top of damage award
in context of natural resource damage actions).
111. Id.
112. Much scholarship has been devoted to critiquing or proposing various
fee structures to encourage private enforcement. See, e.g., Lucia A. Silecchia,
The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in Environmental
Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
(2004); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on
Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney
General, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1087 (2007).
113. The California Supreme Court addressed some ofthese controls in Cnty.
of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010).
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should be informed in writing that she may contact the lead
public attorney directly and without contacting the substitute
environmental special counselor.114 The Professional Service
Contract must make specific provision for this hierarchy of
decision-making and controls. 115
CONCLUSION

The environmental special counsel arrangement has
significant potential social utility because it can greatly
enhance governments' abilities to detect and enforce
environmental violations. The arrangement can facilitate
social efficiency by augmenting government enforcement
resources, providing heightened deterrence and enhancing
civil penalties. Moreover, the arrangement advances social
equity by mitigating inferior enforcement power that
disproportionately impacts socio-economically disadvantaged
groups.
In this way, the arrangement facilitates
environmental justice for poorer communities that have been
affected by environmental contamination but whose
government enforcement structures cannot provide redress.
It not only provides restorative efforts that can assist those
presently impacted by contamination, but it further promotes
intergenerational equity by providing restorative activity and,
thus, resource sustainability for future generations.
The arrangement, however, imposes societal costs.
Because the environmental special counsel arrangement
encourages entrepreneurial behavior in the context of public
environmental enforcement actions, there exists the potential
for suboptimal deterrence and public compensation because of
a misalignment between the interests of the government and
its environmental special counsel proxy. Of the many costs,
the most significant, from the standpoint of suboptimal
environmental enforcement, is the entrepreneur's motivation
to seek monetized damages where the public's environmental
injury is best redressed by equitable restorative relief.
There should be a preference for government-led
enforcement where feasible to avoid the monitoring problems
inherent with outside counsel arrangements of any sort. But,
where governments lack the resources or choose not to
114. [d.
115. [d.
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enforce, there should be privatized substitute enforcement,
beyond what is now captured by citizen suit enforcement, to
ensure maximal violations redress.
This augmentation
provides standing for private attorneys general who might
not otherwise surmount the Article III standing hurdle of
citizen suit provisions.
While enhanced privatized enforcement beyond that
which is currently captured by citizen suit provisions is
desirable, this Article proposes that a better resolution will be
one that uses a reasonable fee-shifting mechanism on top of
rather than a contingency fee drawn from-the damage
award as its compensatory structure. That adjustment will
mitigate the problem caused by entrepreneurial agents'
preference for monetary awards. Because restorative remedy
is such an integral component of effective environmental
enforcement, the reform is worthwhile. Finally, there should
be adequate controls on the government monitoring process.

***

